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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  article  examines  the  socio-political  dynamics  in  the evolution  and  development  of Flemish  technol-
ogy  assessment  (TA).  Broadly  defined,  TA  encompasses  activities  and  programs  that  expand  and  deepen
the knowledge  base  of contemporary  knowledge-based  economies  (KBEs),  typically  by including  new
actors (e.g.  trade  unions),  ideas  (e.g. science  in  society),  and rationales  (e.g.  participatory  techniques)
in  science,  technology,  and  innovation  (STI)  processes.  Starting  from  the  regionalization  of  STI policy  in
Belgium  and the convergence  of  Flemish  STI  around  global  KBE  principles,  the  article  exemplifies  how
since  the  1980s  successive  Flemish  TA  waves  (early-warning,  bottom-up,  and  interactive  TA)  have  co-
evolved  with  successive  generations  of  Flemish  innovation  policy.  Building  on these  findings,  it arguesnnovation policy
olitical governance
echnology assessment
that  Flemish  TA  has  counteracted  and  accommodated  dominant  STI  paradigms.  By providing  a  historical
and  socio-political  perspective  on  TA  and innovation  policy,  the  article  draws  critical  attention  to the
institutional  settings  and  societal  contexts  in which  TA is  embedded,  and  questions  TA’s  strategic  utility
within  contemporary  KBEs.  This  perspective  sheds  light  on  the  Flemish  government’s  recent  decision  to
close its  parliamentary  TA  institute  and  the  institutional  expansion  of TA  elsewhere  in  Europe.
©  2015  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
In Flanders, Belgium, government officials, business and indus-
ry leaders, academics, and journalists frequently unveil to one
nother their views on how to spur innovation for economic
rowth and ensure quality of life. Hence, in a 2006 government-
anctioned report entitled Innovative Flanders: Innovation Policies
or the 21st Century, we read that Flanders must ensure “innovation-
ed growth,” as the welfare and wellbeing of the Flemish people
epend on high-technological innovation in the wake of “globaliza-
ion.” In their contribution to the report, the then Flemish Minister
f Innovation and members of her ministry call for more collabora-
ion and learning among government, industries, and universities,
f Flanders is to remain a “leading innovation region” (CCIP, 2008,
. 13; pp. 17–18).More formally, in 2009 Flemish social partners and captains of
ndustry signed the Pact 2020, indicating a joint resolve to turn Flan-
ers into one of the five top regions in Europe and one of the world’s
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +0032 498367984.
E-mail addresses: michiel.vanoudheusden@ulg.ac.be (M.  van Oudheusden),
charlier@ulg.ac.be (N. Charlier), benedikt.rosskamp@ulg.ac.be (B. Rosskamp),
ierre.delvenne@ulg.ac.be (P. Delvenne).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.06.010
048-7333/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.most competitive economies by 20201. To this end, the Pact out-
lines a number of domains in which progress is to be made and
through which “researchers, companies, and the authorities must
work very closely together” within a framework of “open innova-
tion.” Accordingly, new, collaborative approaches are to be devised,
including ones that sustain the “knowledge commons” on which
innovation depends2.
To a considerable degree, the visions above advance a
strategic-economic rationale to innovation, as they sustain the
understanding that innovation is a must to the creation of well-
paying jobs, securing social welfare, and strengthening capacities
for international competition and global growth. This outlook is
not new. Innovation has long been identified in the social sci-
ences as a major source of economic and social development (e.g.
Schumpeter, 1939; Kondratiev, 1978). It also resonates with views
voiced elsewhere in the industrialized world. To give an exam-
ple, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD, 2010) describes innovation as the chief engine of productiv-
ity that holds the prospect of supporting economic growth on the
1 The term “social partners” encompasses employers’ organizations and trade
































































relatively small interview sample reflects this focus, as only a hand-
ful of people has profound expertise of Flemish TA. We  hence
caution against overstating the role TA in Flanders has played in
4 All interviews were held in Dutch and transcribed in that language based on
repeated listening to the audio-recordings and interview notes we had taken. The878 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Re
heap, particularly in a time of slow economic development, global
arming, and rising prices for natural resources.
In short, innovation and innovation management feature promi-
ently on the public agenda in Flanders, as they do elsewhere,
nd often within a prevalent market-oriented, knowledge-based
conomy (KBE) narrative. Following Wullweber (2008), this narra-
ive simultaneously underlines the cooperative pooling of strategic
esources and the competitive production of new knowledge as
 means of garnering wealth and new employment in industrial-
zed countries. However, the prevalent language of innovation-led
rowth is also extended in ways that suggest a more comprehensive
eading of innovation beyond purely economic and commercial
nterests. Flemish innovation industries, policymakers, and aca-
emics increasingly acknowledge the importance of integrating
cological and social concerns into research and development
R&D) and business processes if technological innovation is to suc-
eed. In fact, the aim of broadening innovation to include “its
on-technological aspects” is now explicitly on the agenda of
ndustry players and the Flemish government as a whole (Vervliet,
006, p. 19). Correspondingly, contemporary science policy dis-
ourse is laden with notions such as horizontal governance, open
nnovation, and social innovation, which stress not only strategic
ooperation between multiple actors, including stakeholders and
ublics, but also the co-evolution of technology and society (Felin
nd Zenger, 2013). As stated in the Flemish government’s 2006
ction program Flanders in Action (VIA), Flanders has “great need
or a competitive economy, not only to face and tackle the chal-
enges confronting us today and tomorrow, but also to be able
o accomplish our goal of creating an open, caring, concerned,
nd sustainable social environment.  . . there can be neither room
or patience for poverty, social inequality, or exclusion.” Thus,
ocial and ecological concerns have entered the policy lexicon,
s has the question of how to incorporate such concerns into
nnovation strategies. Innovation then, is not only about ensur-
ng international competitiveness through knowledge networking
nd management, but also about meeting the needs of citizens, and
rganizing interaction among a larger variety of technological and
ocial actors than has thus far been the case. As these actors include
lemish and European “stakeholders” and citizens, who operate
ithin the framework of an open and inclusive European econ-
my, the VIA program aligns with a broader set of initiatives, such
s the 2000 Lisbon Agenda and the more recently established EU
esearch and Innovation program, Horizon 20203.
Taking these extensions of mainstream STI discourses as its
ntry point, this article examines how Flemish STI is affected by,
nd potentially transformed through, technology assessments (TAs).
roadly defined, TA encompasses activities and programs that
xtend and deepen the knowledge base of contemporary KBEs,
ypically by including new actors (e.g. trade unions), ideas (e.g. sci-
nce in society), and rationales (e.g. participatory techniques) in STI
rocesses. Research on TA suggests that the role of TA in national,
ransnational, and international innovation processes can be sub-
tantial (Joss and Bellucci, 2002; Delvenne, 2011; Rodmeyer et al.,
005; Ganzevles et al., 2014). Even if particular TA activities do not
irectly impact on innovation policy, TA can catalyze democratic
ebate on technology, raise public awareness about sociotechnical
ssues, or simply bring together actors and their issues in origi-
al ways (Ely et al., 2014; Hennen, 1999; Bütschi and Nentwich,
002, p. 245). As we show in this article, from the 1980s onwards
lemish TA initiatives challenged technology-centric, market-led
nnovation policies for failing to consider the wider social, eco-
ogical, and ethical ramifications of technology. Shortly after the
3 See the Flemish government’s VIA website for countless references to these
uropean initiatives. Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886
first Flemish government was  installed, policy actors instigated
TA programs in an attempt to alleviate the social, economic, and
legal consequences of new technologies like biotechnology. These
programs emerged in response to pressure from the trade unions,
among others, who  demanded that R&D agents take into concern
workers’ safety and wellbeing. In more recent years, interactive
TA forms have developed involving civil society organizations and
lay publics, with the aim of formulating social and environmen-
tal needs as a starting point for R&D. Hence, the enlargement of
innovation terms and rationales in Flemish STI policies can partly
be traced back to TA interventions in Flemish workspaces, gover-
ning bodies (e.g. Flemish parliament), and industrial R&D processes.
These spaces in turn provided a fertile basis for the further devel-
opment of TA and its institutional uptake, as Flemish TA evolved
with, and ongoingly drew inspiration from, TA processes elsewhere,
including constructive TA (Schot and Rip, 1997), parliamentary TA
(Decker and Ladikas, 2004; Ganzevles and Van Est, 2012), and par-
ticipatory TA (Joss and Bellucci, 2002). Flemish TA can hence be
seen as an instructive “test case” for how various kinds of TA min-
gled with innovation policies and practices within the confines of
a high-technology, innovation-driven KBE.
To put the above considerations in due empirical and historical
perspective, we  retrace the emergence and evolution of Flem-
ish TA in connection to Flemish and European innovation policy
(part 2). Our description draws on documentary analysis and on
accounts provided to us by policy analysts and spokesmen, indus-
try research leaders, and academics well-knowledgeable of Flemish
and European innovation policy and TA. These interviewees were
identified through their association with TA or selected based on
an initial analysis of newspaper coverage, innovation reports, policy
memos, and agency documents, as well as legislation and records
of parliamentary hearings dating back to the eighties4. The his-
torical overview presented in part 2 is followed by a section on
the so-called Three Generations model of innovation from the
innovation systems literature (part 3). Contemporary policy dis-
course (both Flemish and European) and TA language invoke this
evolutionary model of technical change in pursuit of a more inter-
active and collaborative innovation process that involves actors
from “all policy domains,” including governments, industries, uni-
versities and schools, as well as “societal stakeholders” and wider
publics (Larosse, 2004, p. 6; Kuhlmann, 2001a). Thus, through the
Generations model, TA and mainstream innovation discourse are
potentially aligned. This alignment opens onto new, potentially
powerful, STI articulations that may or may  not evoke shared sense
making among implicated actors. It therefore begs the question as
to which role TA can, and should, play in present-day processes of
“innovation governance” (Felt et al., 2007) (part 4).
We stress upfront that this study does not fully map  the policy
debate on innovation in Flanders or Europe. Rather, the emphasis
is on TA actors and processes, and particularly on the broad-
ening of innovation terms and actions through Flemish TA. Theinterview approach was semi-structured, as we started from a number of key
themes, such as the history of Flemish innovation, which are found in the abovemen-
tioned documentary sources. From a concern with securing credible interpretations
and  deepening the scope of the data, various respondents were interviewed up to
four times. Of the ten interviewees who responded to an initial draft of this paper
(which the first author circulated in April 2012), all affirmed the accuracy of our
interpretations, although four added valuable comments, which led us to further
nuance or accentuate particular points. A list of interviewees is provided in Appendix




























































effort, it was  “primarily a campaign to raise awareness and promote
new technologies and innovation.” In that respect it was  highly suc-
cessful as well7. Furthermore, DIRV was a conspicuous campaign,
6 Following Larosse (2001), the First Industrial Revolution refers to the changes
that  took place in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc. in the 18th century, and in
which the region of Wallonia played a lead role on the European continent. The Sec-
ond  Industrial Revolution began around 1957, when the European Community was
established. Thanks to its central geographical location, its highly educated, multi-
lingual, and relatively cheap workforce, Flanders drew in multinational investments
intended to supply the entire Community. However, the subsequent economic crisisM. van Oudheusden et al. / Re
roadening traditional, usually linear, views of innovation, even if
ur findings suggest that it has in important instances facilitated
landers’ transition to a KBE that seeks to be sustainable, inclu-
ive, and democratic. The gradual institutional and public uptake
f TA in Flanders bears witness to this interpretation, even if var-
ous context factors are always at play. We  thus concur with Joss
nd Bellucci (2002, p. 9) that the actual performance of TA should
lways be understood as the interplay between the wider institu-
ional and social settings in which TA is embedded and which no
ingle actor can control. In other words, these settings co-evolve,
s a change in the innovation system can influence the (expected)
utput of a TA activity, for instance.
By emphasizing the specific manners in which Flemish political
ulture, innovation system thinking, and TA dynamically co-evolve,
his article seeks to accomplish two key aims: (1) To provide
 deeper historical and contextual understanding as to how TA
merged and developed with Flemish innovation policy and R&D
ractice; (2) To open new inroads towards analyzing and debating
he socio-political dynamics in the evolution of TA in knowledge-
riven economies.
Upon attending to these objectives, the article reconsiders
he relationship between TA, science and technology policymak-
ng, and innovation governance. Although TA is often presented
s a management or governance tool in the TA literature (Van
udheusden, 2014a), TA processes enact, as well as counteract,
ominant STI policies, and typically do so at the intersection of
ociotechnical spheres, policies, and temporalities. How TA pos-
tions itself or is positioned in relation to these dominant policy
aradigms is particularly relevant to consider in view of the Flemish
overnment’s 2012 decision to close its parliamentary TA agency,
he Institute for Science and Technology. Whereas this decision
ppears largely out of sync with the institutional expansion of TA
n other parts of Europe (e.g. in Wallonia and through the EU-wide
ACITA project, on which more below), it coincides with the reor-
anization of the iconic Danish Board of Technology. Rendering
xplicit the interplay between TA and STI policies and institutions is
ence important to understand longer-term STI dynamics, possibil-
ties, and constraints both in and beyond Belgium, even when these
ossibilities are not immediately picked up or await enactment. It
an also render explicit how the integration of social rationales into
nnovation elicits tensions and struggles among actors and pro-
rams, as prevalent policy concepts like open innovation or the
resently fashionable notion of “responsible innovation” do not
eadily translate into innovation practice (Von Schomberg, 2012).
he article thus paves the way for reflection on the evolving viabil-
ty and utility of TA within contemporary KBEs, as TA and STI engage
n an “innovation policy dance” (Kuhlmann et al., 2010, pp. 7–8);
hat is, the two spheres interchange prevailing perspectives and
pproaches by “dancing” together5. The Flemish TA experiences the
rticle describes can thus serve STI policymakers, TA communities,
nd innovation scholars as resources to ponder the role, place, and
rientation of regional, national, and transnational TA in the years
head, as talk of broadening, deepening, and governing innovation
ains policy traction.
. “Innovative Flanders”: From third industrial revolution
o third generation innovation policy
Since the 1970s, constitutional reforms have gradually trans-
ormed Belgium from a unified state into a federal one with
ommunities, regions, and language areas. The reforms were
nacted as a way of finding constitutional solutions for the
5 Alternatively, one could use the metaphor of “dancing partners,” as does Rip
1992) to imply that innovation theory, policy, and practice dynamically interact. Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1879
problems between the country’s Dutch and French speaking com-
munities. As a consequence of these reforms, the Belgian innovation
system came to be decentralized, based on a horizontal division of
policy domains between the regions of Flanders (in the north), Wal-
lonia (in the south), and the Brussels Capital region (in the center).
Each entity now pursues, develops, and implements its own  inno-
vation policy, more or less independent from the federal state and
from one another.
Although Flanders is presently the economically richer region,
it lagged behind Wallonia until the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury. It became more prosperous than Wallonia after the Second
World War, following the decline of Wallonia’s coal and iron indus-
tries. When the first ever Flemish Executive (the initial name for
the Flemish government) came to power in the early 1980s, it
made attempts to boost Flemish economic self-awareness and posi-
tion Flanders as an industrial, entrepreneurial, high-tech region
(Oosterlynck, 2006, p. 98). Since then, large-scale investments in
biotechnology, new materials, broadband technology, microelec-
tronics and nanotechnology have been made with measurable
economic gains, and government agencies and institutes erected
to support “innovative technological R&D” (CCIP, 2008, p. 27).
A determining figure in transforming Flanders into a new, invig-
orated economy after the economic crisis of the seventies was
the then chair of the Flemish government, Gaston Geens. Geens
launched “DIRV,” which stands for Derde Industriële Revolutie
Vlaanderen, literally Third Industrial Revolution Flanders6. This
action program was officially launched in 1982. Geens repeatedly
spoke of DIRV as an offensive policy to create new products, pro-
duction methods, and markets for industries of the future (Vlaamse
Raad, 1983). He also stressed that it was  the government’s task
to stimulate innovation in new technologies, while entrepreneurs
and industries designed concrete projects in tandem with research
institutes, universities, and private companies. Oosterlynck (2006,
p. 98), in his political-economic study of regionalism in Flanders,
sums up these key threads of DIRV as follows:
. . . the DIRV-action stressed the central role of the entrepreneur
as the carrier of innovative potential. There was  a strong focus
on high technology industries and the role of the state was  rede-
fined as supplying the conditions for innovation to take place.
The effects of DIRV on innovation policy and practice are tan-
gible, as the program lent support to various basic and applied
technologies, including the highly promising and already emanat-
ing fields of biotechnology, new materials, and microelectronics.
Less perceptibly, but equally important, DIRV delivered a deci-
sive break with Flemish economic pessimism. As again Oosterlynck
(2006, p. 101) writes, although DIRV was  an institutional policythreatened Flemish welfare, inciting a Third Industrial Revolution.
7 To lend support to this assertion, Oosterlynck cites Paul Zeeuwts, a past chair
of  the government-funding agency IWT. Zeeuwts argues that “[n]obody, not even
the  staunchest critics of the DIRV action, dispute that it succeeded in breaking the
economic pessimism of the Flemish population and business world and that it led
to  a renewed dynamism and courage (our translation).” René De Feyter, then head
of  the Flemish employers’ organization and an important ally of Geens, argues that
DIRV  succeeded in inciting pride among Flemings, demonstrating that they could


























































the theory of regional innovation systems that accompanied the
emergence of regionally identifiable clusters of industrial activity,
and which casts the region as the most appropriate scale at which to880 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Re
hich served the Flemish government to present “a clear image
f itself to the general public, with an offensive policy of its own,
istinct from both Walloon policy and national policy” (Goorden,
004, p. 8).
Various authors and interviewees hence identify DIRV as a “key-
tone” not just in instigating contemporary innovation policy in
landers, but also acknowledge its role in the construction of Flan-
ers as an innovation region, even if their appreciations of the
rogram vary. For the purpose of this article it is important to
ote that actions like DIRV induced a range of political-economic
eforms that emphasized entrepreneurship and restricted Keynes-
ike state intervention in the economy. While these restructurings
merged in response to various international and domestic trends
nd challenges (e.g. the linguistic conflict in Belgium), they were
lso the result of ideological crafting and the search for new pol-
cy paradigms (Witte et al., 1997, p. 321). It is partly against this
ackground that ensuing programs, actions, and contestations in
he Flemish innovation context should be understood, including
he emergence of technology assessment and the broadening of
he notion of innovation that TA engenders.
.1. Resistance to DIRV and scope for change
As a program of large-scale reform, DIRV did not go uncon-
ested. Strong opposition to DIRV came primarily from the political
eft, including the socialist trade union ABVV (representing tradi-
ional industries, among others), as well as one of its most vocal
ritics in the Flemish parliament, the socialist Norbert De Batse-
ier, who after Geens went on to become the Minister of Economy.
hese actors criticized DIRV not just for its “liberal” emphasis on
ntrepreneurship and small government, but also for its neglect
f “social dimensions” [Goorden, 2012]8. From the trade union’s
oint of view, the DIRV action was too much about rationalizing
ork and cutting jobs; a point they argued with the active support
f labor sociologists from various universities, who were critical of
he government’s labor policies. The unions contended that DIRV
acked a broad debate about how to organize industry, the role
f the state, and participation of the labor movement [Berckmans,
012]9. Similarly, the ABVV saw DIRV as too opportunistic, as the
rogram emerged from the minds of an elite cadre of politicians,
echnocrats, and venture capitalists rather than through the more
ustomary process of collective bargaining, which brings together
rade unions, employers’ organizations, and the government.
Given these expressed concerns and needs, various interviewees
uggest a causal link between the above criticisms and Geens’s
stablishment in 1984 of Stichting Technologie Vlaanderen (STV),
hich officially translates into Flemish Foundation for Technology
ssessment [Berloznik, 2011; Goorden, 2012; Berckmans, 2012].
imilarly, in his biography of De Batselier, Hellinck (2010, p. 128)
tates that STV was erected because the DIRV action failed to take
nto account “the impacts of new technology on society.”
As a government-financed agency led by the social partners
nd embedded in the Social Economic Council of Flanders (SERV),
TV’s aim was to analyze the social dimensions of new technolo-
ies and advise the government on science and technology issues
SERV-STV, 1994; Goorden, 1990). One interviewee describes STV
s a compromise between more “liberal” and “socialist” views of
nnovation policy, adding that although STV’s mission was ambigu-
us from the start, the organization managed to “socially assist,”
nd thus “soften,” the transition of the Flemish economy to post-
ordism by questioning the assumption that technological growth
8 In this article, square brackets indicate that the quotes are taken from interviews.
9 A point of view the ABVV shared with its sister organization, the Christian-
emocrat trade union ACV. Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886
automatically implies economic growth [Oosterlynck, 2010]. Other
respondents argue that STV contributed to providing a more com-
plex understanding of the relationship between innovation and
labor in which the role of the government is redefined [Berloznik,
2011; Holemans, 2012; Larosse, 2011].
While it is hard to assess the precise contribution of STV to
innovation policy, its erection in 1984 appears to have had some
influence on the discourses of innovation at the time. This is not
just because it was a consensually-managed advisory organization
that had to take into account different political visions, but as one
respondent who  worked at STV points out, a leading politician like
De Batselier literally integrated chunks of text from STV outlets
in his parliamentary speeches [Goorden, 2012]. Consequently, the
agency succeeded in introducing the notion of TA in the policy arena
(Berckmans, 2007, p. 84).
Other respondents acknowledge the influence of STV in shaping
policy: “The introduction of technology assessments in organiza-
tional processes was  in large part thanks to STV, and was rooted
in the criticism that DIRV lacked consideration of social dimen-
sions in innovation” [Berloznik, 2011; Maes, 2012]. Thus, through
STV “innovation” was broadened to encompass other concerns than
purely economic ones, such as the unions’ concerns for wellbeing
in the workplace, quality of work, and labor organization, and in
a later stage also ethical and ecological aspects of technological
innovation10.
2.2. Further expanding the scope: Towards a third generation
innovation policy
After the regional elections of 1988, Flemish innovation policy
officially fell in hands of the Socialist Party, much to the dismay of
Geens (Hellinck, 2010, p. 170)11. Since then, innovation thinking
has shifted to a Third Generation Policy, on which more shortly.
Although certain respondents relate these policy changes to shifts
in the political landscape (i.e. the political actions that were taken to
counter, or at least balance, DIRV reforms), structural factors are to
be considered as well. According to Larosse (2001), the DIRV action,
in promoting innovation as a distinct policy objective, instilled into
the minds of Flemish policymakers an awareness of the KBE, as
knowledge generation and the economy were now seen as inextri-
cably intertwined. Thus, the challenge for all policymakers both on
the left and the right became one of reorganizing Flemish society
in order to make better use of knowledge across borders and dis-
ciplines, which in turn stimulated entrepreneurs, researchers, and
industries to pool resources. Importantly, this change also induced
certain expansions in the sense that new actors, actions, and issues
were brought to the policy table to make innovation policy more
“coherent” (Van Humbeeck et al., 2004).
Without going into full detail, we  attempt to capture the main
tenets of the so-called Third Generation Innovation Policy (TGIP),
as TGIP is an important “theoretical building block” from the inno-
vation systems literature, which innovation actors in Flanders and
the EU draw on to direct innovation [Larosse, 2011; Berloznik, 2013;
Evers, 2013; Goorden, 2012] (Zeeuwts, 2004). TGIP also aligns withsustain innovation-based learning economies (Asheim and Isaksen,
10 Although STV initially developed a TA program, the agency later dropped TA
from its “already considerably wide-ranging” agenda, choosing instead to focus
on socio-economic matters (Berckmans, 2009). In June 2000, a parliamentary TA
institution called viWTA was erected, on which more later.
11 Although there was no Minister of Innovation or portfolio at the time, De Bat-
selier took the lead in this policy area.
M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1881
Table  1
Overview of the first, second, and third generation of innovation policy.
FGIP SGIP TGIP
Time period 80 s 90 s ?
View  of innovation
process
Linear, from research to market Nonsequential feedback loops Complex, nonlinear, interactive,
nontechnical as well as technical
Main  actors Scientists and government As in FGIP plus “nontechnical” actors,
e.g. ‘social partners’; government as
innovation mentor/enabler
Actors from all policy domains and all
relevant stakeholders; includes social
scientists and lay publics
Types  of relations
among agents
Vertical, hierarchical Networked (“horizontal”) Integrated, cooperative





















































Main  emphasis Science and technology Inn
a It should be noted that these two FGIP concepts were not prominent in the eigh
997). This explains TGIP’s popularity in Flanders, where policy-
akers and innovation actors look to establish Flanders as a leading
nnovation-led economy in the world and develop its cultural iden-
ity (Delvenne, 2011, p. 224). As both TGIP and regional innovation
ystems theory are indebted to the evolutionary theory of techni-
al change, they sustain the now prevalent reading of innovation
s a creative process that benefits from collaborative interaction
etween innovation agents (Cooke et al., 2000).
Following Lengrand et al. (2002), this emphasis on interac-
ive learning and joint knowledge building emerges in response
o First and Second GIP. In Flanders, FGIP, is usually associated
ith the DIRV action and reflects the “linear model of innova-
ion”; i.e. the idea that new processes and products are developed
hrough scientific discovery in a laboratory and subsequently
reak through and are diffused on market. With FGIP, often char-
cterized as a science-driven and “technology-push” approach
Berckmans, 2009), Flemish innovation policy selectively rewarded
hose research groups who placed their research activities explic-
tly in the domains government pushed for. With the aim of “picking
inners,” Flemish government encouraged world-class research in
eneric technology fields such as microelectronics. As a result, uni-
ersities and public research institutions with an interuniversity
tructure became influential players in innovation. The institu-
ional context in which they operated emphasized the central role
f research actors in the innovation system with the focus on a
cience-driven philosophy.
SGIP, which came to the fore in the mid-nineties, offers a more
ntegrated take on innovation, as it acknowledges the complex
nterplay between science, technology, and nontechnical groups
f actors, such as social and economic sectors. In Flanders, this
pproach was reflected in government support of a bottom-up
rowth of innovation clusters as horizontal collaborations between
ll innovation actors (companies, universities, technological insti-
utions, public administrations), with attention for spontaneous
eedback loops between innovation phases. Following this thread
f thought, the Flemish government sought to stimulate endoge-
ous growth in Flanders by anchoring technological innovation in
eographic regions and existing activities (Goorden et al., 2008, p.
70).
More recently, Flemish policymakers generally appeal to TGIP;
fficially at least, as certain aspects of FGIP and SGIP are still found
n Flemish policy documents and practices12. TGIP’s importance
s that it places innovation on the agenda of every policy domain,
or instance in the areas of education, healthcare, and sustain-
ble development. Consequently, innovation is to be developed
12 As Lengrand et al. (2002) note, “[t]here are dangers in announcing the immi-
ence of a ‘third generation’ policy, when progress still needs to be made to make the
econd generation a reality!” Clearly, First and Second Generations ways of thinking
bout innovation co-exist with Third Generation language and concepts.n systems and networks Knowledge, collaboration, and process
ut arose in later years.
interactively, as a systemic activity in which policy instruments are
not only directed towards individual organizations (e.g. through
R&D subsidies) or bilateral relations (e.g. knowledge transfer), but
also to the innovation system as a whole (e.g. managing interfaces
and organizing learning platforms). From this perspective, it is nec-
essary to identify the relevant stakeholders and involve them in
the innovation process early on. Last, in a TGIP framework, it is
important to provide good public information on important waves
of innovation and ensure greater public involvement in decision
making.
Table 1 summarizes the main tenets of each generation of inno-
vation policy.
To offer an indication of how TGIP concepts infuse contemporary
policy discourse, let us briefly consider the Pact 2020 (mentioned
earlier), which is a much referred to “future plan” for Flanders, and
which fits in the overarching framework of Flanders in Action (VIA).
To begin with, the Pact aspires to providing a “social platform”;
hence its signatories include not only the Flemish government, but
also the social partners and civil society organizations, including
environmental organizations. Second, the Pact projects a “long-
term growth path” for Flanders by 2020, with the aims of achieving
greater prosperity and welfare and a competitive and sustainable
economy. These aims constitute one “coherent” policy. Thus, we
read that by 2020 “a proportionate participation in employment
will be assured,” “the demands of Work and Family are better
attuned to one another,” and CO2 emissions lowered in line with
EU targets. As these objectives indicate, the scope of innovation is
expanded to include not just economic goals (growth in a narrow
sense), but sustainable development as the integration of economic,
social, and ecological goals. Moreover, the expansion of economic
goals to other type of policy goals is taken not in terms of con-
straints on growth following a zero-sum logic, but as part of a
coherent social mission with a long-term development perspective
for Flanders (Van Humbeeck et al., 2004).
The Pact’s significance is that it broadens the notion of inno-
vation in ways that are conducive to TA principles and programs;
notably through the shift from linear models of innovation to inter-
active ones, the broadening of actors and issues in innovation, and
talk of collaborative learning and innovation governance. These
principles are consistent with the EU’s governance approach, as
articulated in the European Commission’s 2001 White Paper on
European Governance, which, like Flemish innovation policy, draws
inspiration from the innovation systems literature (e.g. CEC, 2001).
They also open to more inclusive and participatory ways of orga-
nizing innovation, in line with the EU’s Science in Society Action Plan
(e.g. CEC, 2002, p. 6)13.
13 Hence, we  find in the Flemish Minister of Innovation’s 2010 Policy Memoran-
dum on Innovation an explicit reference to the EU Science in Society Action Plan
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We  turn to an example of public participation in STI below,
here we situate a Flemish participatory TA on nanotechnologies.
or now, let us return to the DIRV campaign to situate the emer-
ence of successive Flemish TA waves in relation to EU-wide STI
olicy.
. Three TA waves
Not long after the end of the DIRV action and the erection of STV,
he first TA initiatives were launched as academic research pro-
rams. As these programs were charged with examining the social
mpacts of new technologies such as biotechnology and microelec-
ronics, the need for TA research was framed within the dominant
cience-driven and technology-push approach; i.e. in terms of pre-
icting the social impacts of science and technology in order to
dequately steer and orient governmental research and technology
rograms. One could say that TA was assigned the task of giving
ublic governance a helping hand in “picking winners.” As such,
he initiatives represented an instrumental type of TA in which
he social scientific and policy analytic approaches of experts dom-
nate (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). Following Goorden (2004, p.
1), we label this kind of TA early-warning TA because of its invest-
ent in technological prediction, control of (negative) impacts, and
cientific expertise14.
As indicated earlier, from the nineties onwards there was  a
rowing responsiveness to the idea that Flemish innovation pol-
cy needed a shift in focus, departing from a technology-push
pproach to striving for a policy that stresses the importance of
echnology diffusion. Policymakers therefore called for a kind of
ottom-up TA,  which they described as an approach “that may
ot slow down or have a negative influence on creativity and
he innovation process15.” To this end TA activities had to be
rganized in close interaction with R&D practices in govern-
ental technological programs on biotechnology, new materials
nd energy, and environmental technology. The expectation was
hat if TA were practiced in direct consultation with science and
echnology producers, research would lead to socially useful appli-
ations. A parallel can be drawn here with constructive TA (CTA),
hich emerged a few years earlier in the Netherlands. Like CTA,
ottom-up TA sought to broaden the design, development, and
mplementation of ongoing technology developments by initiat-
ng dialogue among innovation actors about (R&D) design practices
Schot and Rip, 1997). However, as the quote above indicates, Flem-
sh policymakers took explicit care to channel (if not contain) the
otential impact of this type of TA on the innovation process.
The shift from early-warning TA to bottom-up TA can be
llustrated by comparing two Flemish policy documents on biotech-
ology, which outline the role of TA in this technology domain16. In
he first document, entitled Action Program for Biotechnology,  and
ritten by the Prime Minister, Geens, we read that the success-
ul implementation of new biotechnology R&D depends on “social,
conomic, legal, and ecological boundary conditions,” as these con-
itions set a context for biotechnology development (Geens, 1988;
ermanently turn Flanders into a successful knowledge society, it is essential that
ocietal needs and concerns are integrated through ongoing democratic debate with
 more involved and more informed public, and with better opportunities for mak-
ng collective choices as regards science and technology issues (our translation)”
Vlaams Parlement, 2010, p. 36).
14 Other designations that underline the instrumental and control character of TA
ould also apply, such as expert TA or classical TA. For an instructive overview of
hese and other kinds of TA, see Decker and Ladikas (2004, p. 14), Van Est and Brom
2012), and Ely et al. (2014).
15 Technology Note of the Flemish government (1994).
16 We are grateful to Dirk Holemans for directing us to these documents and
ointing out the distinctions between them. Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886
emphasis added). In the second, written two  years later by an
advisor to minister De Batselier, the author similarly urges TA
researchers to consider the “social, economic, legal, and ecological
aspects” of biotechnology. However, she adds that these aspects
are “not boundary conditions, but essential elements for modulat-
ing and orienting” the biotechnology program as a whole (Vervliet,
1990, cited in Holemans, 1994; emphasis added). Thus, whereas in
the action program TA is cast as a corrective mechanism in order
to develop a “favourable social climate” for technology develop-
ment (Geens, 1987, p. 177), the second document proposes a more
integrated method, which directs attention to the aforementioned
social and other aspects in technology development through dia-
logue between multiple disciplines.
A similar emphasis on creating a more integrated technology
approach is found in other Flemish technology programs at the
time (e.g. energy technology, environmental technology, and new
materials)17. To sustain such an approach, TA research units in each
program were set up. Each of these units was  charged with study-
ing the social effects of the technologies at hand. The units would
stimulate dialogue among technology developers, social partners,
and the government, and also seek to broaden the scope of debate
by opening the possible negative effects of technology innovation
to debate, for instance in the areas of environment, health, safety,
and law.
Today, both the early-warning and bottom-up approaches are
considered outdated. Goorden and Deblonde (2011) contend that
top-down academic experiences involving early warning mecha-
nisms for negative impacts of new technologies have not led to a
reorientation of research programs or technology trajectories. In
order to create a more interactive type of TA in which civil society
and citizens participate, TA was lodged in an institution advising
the Flemish parliament in the year 2000, the Flemish Institute for
Science and Technology Assessment, viWTA (later renamed IST).
The institute sought to stimulate social debate on sociotechnical
developments and inform MPs  of the social and ethical implica-
tions of science and technology. Importantly, with the erection of
viWTA, TA was removed from the R&D enterprise. Thus, contrary
to several STV programs and initiatives like the action program on
biotechnologies mentioned above, TA was  not fully ingrained in the
innovation process but took place in a different location and time.
In this respect, developing timely participatory TA frameworks
and procedures to effectively deal with the emergence of new and
emerging technologies remained a big challenge for Flemish inno-
vation policy. In a survey published by viwTA, a group of R&D
directors from companies, universities, and public administrations
voiced some expectations and concerns. They stated that public
governance should play the role of mentor by creating and gov-
erning new ways of collaboration among all relevant social actors.
Second, they underlined the need for a collective vision and the for-
mulation of social demands in relation to the policy goal of spending
3% of Flanders’ Gross Regional Product on R&D by 2010. Third, given
the lack of broad public support for technological innovation in
Flanders, science and technology should have a more prominent
place on the public agenda.
In response to these policy calls for a more integrated and
inclusive innovation policy, the Flemish government endorsed a
large participatory TA project on nanotechnologies in 2006, enti-
tled Nanotechnologies for Tomorrow’s Society (NanoSoc). NanoSoc
sought to develop new forms of collaboration in which all social
actors stimulate technology innovation and R&D receives broad
17 As mentioned earlier, the idea of integrating TA into technology policy was  a
central concern of the then Flemish Minister of Economy. This is indicated by his
resolve to “(. . .)  weave technology assessment into all the facets of technology policy
(our translation)” (Vlaamse Raad, 1991, p. 4).















































contemporary KBEs, which is precisely what STI policymakers and
various innovation enactors claim innovation is, or should be,  about
(Stilgoe et al., 2013; Ely et al., 2014; Rodriguez et al., 2013)19.Fig. 1. TA waves in relation to generations of innovation policy.
ublic support (Goorden et al., 2008, pp. 171–172). The project
pproach was novel to Flanders, as social scientists working in
A took the lead throughout the project’s duration rather than
ngineers or technologists. Second, the project sought to provide
anotechnologists in Flanders with incentives to reflect on social
nd ethical issues in relation to nanotechnology development so
uch considerations are brought to bear on their work. To this end,
uccessive participation rounds were initiated involving nanotech-
ologists, stakeholders, and citizens. These rounds were initiated
efore and during actual nanotechnology R&D stages in research
enters in order to allow timely adjustment of strategic research
gendas. NanoSoc thus pulled out researchers from their labs in
n effort to initiate broad-range, interactive TA.  The project drew
nspiration from contemporary TA forms designed to “open up” and
broaden out” the social appraisal of technology (Stirling, 2008;
ly et al., 2014). These forms included real-time TA (Guston and
arewitz, 2002), constructive TA (Schot and Rip, 1997), interactive
A (Grin et al., 1997), and the TA-related approach of upstream
ublic engagement (Macnaghten et al., 2005). In line with these
rameworks, NanoSoc sought to instigate an ongoing, delibera-
ive role-principles dialogue on technoscientific responsibility that
mplicates wider society and scientists on the work floor, ulti-
ately with the aim of developing an interactive methodology
or socially responsible technology development (Goorden and
eblonde, 2011). Hence, it took the role of TA in Flemish innovation
 step further than we have seen thus far18.
Having outlined the range of Flemish TA approaches, let us
onsider how the three TA waves described above (early-warning,
ottom-up, and interactive)  link to the three generations of innova-
ion policy presented earlier. Fig. 1 positions each wave in relation
o one or more generations.
In the figure above, TA is presented as the interplay between
nnovation programs (FGIP, SGIP, TGIP) and technologies. The term
echnology here comprises “a range of devices, instruments, cal-
ulations and inscriptions,” which articulate and make operable
Miller and O’Leary, 2007). Seen through this sociopolitical lens of
nactment and fabrication, early-warning TA mediates the tran-
ition from FGIP to SGIP, whereas bottom-up TA and interactive
A mediate the transition from FGIP and SGIP to TGIP, albeit by
mphasizing different aspects. It is important to note that this
18 For more on NanoSoc and the TA approaches that informed it, see Goorden et al.
2008) and Van Oudheusden (2014b). Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1883
classification stresses the mediating potential of TA. In reality, inter-
vention does not amount to simply implementing schemes or
theories. Nor are the generations and TA waves distinct histor-
ical stages that follow one another in an inevitable sequence;
rather, various elements combine, depending on local context. For
instance, early-warning TA served both a technology-push strategy
and enabled social partners to articulate previously unconsidered
social needs. Or, to give another example, whereas with bottom-up
TA the aim was to integrate TA into technology programs, today TA
is no longer an integral component of Flemish technology policy.
We conclude this section by reiterating the different roles TA
practices have played in Flanders to this day. While in general
terms, TA mediated between economic and technological ratio-
nales on the one hand, and social and environmental concerns, on
the other, TA was implanted in several Flemish technology action
programs in the 1980s–1990s. In subsequent years, TA took on the
form of a policy tool liked to parliament, as well as a more experi-
mental, interactive form tied to the abovementioned contemporary
international TA frameworks.
4. Discussion: Quo Vadis TA?
What do we  learn from the Flemish TA experiences and how
do these relate to STI developments more broadly? In this section,
we provide three answers to these questions by outlining defining
features of Flemish TA and STI, which we infer from our historical
and sociological overview. Our responses emerge in the context of
recent, cross-regional and cross-national STI and TA developments,
notably the EU policy shift towards responsible innovation gover-
nance and the potential expansion of TA activities in Wallonia and
elsewhere in Europe.
A first important observation is that Flemish TA emerged and
matured in a strategic, knowledge-centered STI environment; i.e.
an environment that forges new alliances between the scientific
establishment, policymakers, and societal actors for the sake of
science-driven economic development. As Delvenne (2011, p. 335;
Delvenne et al., 2011) notes in his study of European parliamen-
tary TA institutes, the institutionalization of TA may  well depend
upon the emergence of strategic science as a new mode of knowl-
edge production. Following Rip (2000), strategic science heralds a
shift in scientific knowledge production from relatively isolated,
“basic,” academic research, to research that is economically and
socially relevant and that can only be understood within a con-
text of application. As we have seen, TA potentially transforms this
context by bringing more diverse epistemic cultures and “knowl-
edges” into STI processes. Knowledge here no longer only refers
to intellectual property, technological applications, and scientific
beliefs, but also, and increasingly so, to new kinds of expertise (e.g.
sociological, lay, indigenous), to new forms and manifestations of
relevance (e.g. social and ecological concerns, mutual learning, and
the acquisition of skills), and the democratization of sociotechnical
culture at large (Knorr-Cetina, 1999: 8; Bijker, 1995). TA can thus
contribute to broadening, deepening, and governing knowledge in19 Consider in this light the various citations of Flemish STI policy documents pro-
vided in this article’s introduction. Consider also the many EU policy discourses
on  integrating science in society for the sake of good innovation governance. For
instance, in a 2013 Expert Group Report to the EU’s Directorate General for Research
and Innovation, we  read that ““The [Responsible Research and Innovation] approach
has to be a key part of the research and innovation process and should be established
as  a collective, inclusive and system-wide approach” (downloaded on 14 October
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The development of TA in other KBE contexts (e.g. the
etherlands, Denmark, Germany) lends weight to the above
ypothesis, as does the emergence of significant EU-wide Science
n Society projects like Parliaments and Civil Society in Technol-
gy Assessment (PACITA; 2011-20145) and previous initiatives
ike EUROPTA20. While it is too early to establish PACITA’s policy
mpacts, it is important to note that PACITA is designed to facilitate
coordination and networking activities, dissemination and use of
nowledge” in support of research activities and policies across
urope. In fact, PACITA is construed as a “Mobilisation and Mutual
earning Action Plan [that] will distribute capacity and enhance
he institutional foundation for knowledge-based policy-making
n issues involving science, technology and innovation (. . .)21.”
The potential influence of PACITA is felt in Wallonia, which
ontrary to Flanders has not institutionalized TA, but which now
xplicitly gears its STI policy towards the KBE and strategic sci-
nce (e.g. Plan Marshall, 2022). At present, TA advocates and
olicymakers debate the opportunity of establishing a Walloon TA
nstitute linked to the Walloon parliament. They do so with the
xplicit aim of rendering TA serviceable to Walloon STI policy-
aking, in line with PACITA’s aims of activating multiple kinds of
nowledge and engaging multiple societal actors in STI decision
aking (Van Oudheusden, 2013).
Based on these examples, it would appear that TA not only
elies on, but thrives in,  the context of knowledge-driven innova-
ion. However, if TA is to exert a lasting influence in the KBE, TA
ctors must render clear to policymakers and innovation actors TA’s
redentials as a decisive knowledge player. Recent developments,
uch as the closing of the Flemish parliamentary TA institute, IST,
nd the restructuring of the DBT by the Flemish and Danish govern-
ent, suggest that these credentials cannot be taken for granted.
e return to this point shortly.
Second, and in relation to our first observation, Flemish TA taps
nto a political culture that emphasizes the importance of social
oncertation. In countries like Belgium (but also Switzerland, the
etherlands, and some would argue the EU at large), collective
argaining between trade unions, employers’ organizations, and
overnments is an important political and social tradition that
llows TA practices to gain a firm foothold in multi-layered, conso-
iational democracies (Lijphart, 1977). The erection of the Flemish
A institute STV in response to the DIRV campaign illustrates this
oint, as trade unions demanded their say in STI policymaking.
een in this way, TA can arbitrate between scientific, political,
nd social worlds. When TA is integrated into R&D settings (e.g.
lemish technology action programs) and/or embedded in formal
olicymaking bodies, it can open onto new negotiation practices
nd establish a more integrative decision-making culture. TA can
ence contribute to “strengthening more responsive relations in
he governance of innovation” (Ely et al., 2014); by promoting vari-
us kinds of communication among concerned actors (government,
ocial partners, academia, citizens), by developing democratically
egitimate meeting spaces for these actors and their concerns, or
imply by reopening debate on sociotechnical issues (Bütschi and
entwich, 2002, p. 240).However, the institutionalization of TA entails risks, as well
s opportunities. As noted earlier, when the IST (formerly viwTA)
as installed in the Flemish parliament in 2000, TA was physically
20 This EUROPTA research project was initiated by the Danish Board of Technology
ithin the European Participatory TA network EPTA; see www.eptanetwork.org.
ther, related, initiatives include those implemented by the European Parliament’s
cience and Technology Options Assessment unit, STOA; see www.europarl.europa.
u/stoa.
21 Downloaded on 8 August 2014 from http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/98487
n.html. Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886
removed from the R&D process. Thus, while TA gained a foothold
within formal Flemish policy circles, it became less ingrained in
scientific and technological research activities across the region.
Second, as Horst (2014) argues in relation to the restructuring of
the DBT by the Danish government in 2011, when TA is embedded
within formal policymaking bodies and processes, it risks being
domesticated or “tamed.” This is because ideas, roles, and values
that were once considered new subsequently become the norm.
When these new norms are socially established, innovation typi-
cally takes on other challenges, forms, and orientations. Established
organizations may  then find it hard to change, adapt, and reposition
themselves to meet new needs in complex and changing environ-
ments, and may  even become obsolete (Gubrium and Holstein,
2001). As Horst notes, in Denmark democratic debate about science
and technology lost momentum after the DBT’s institutionalization
in 1986. In the years that followed, Danes came to take debate of
this kind for granted. In fact, many Danes appeared ignorant of the
DBT’s existence.
Whether or not similar assertions can be made about the clos-
ing of the Flemish IST is an open question. As with any institutional
reform, the reasons for the IST’s closure are manifold and com-
plex; they pertain to the institute’s ambiguous public identity and
its relation to parliament and governmental agencies, the multiple
missions inscribed in its statutes, and to how the IST was managed
on a day-to-day basis, among others22. Rather than develop these
reasons in detail, we  draw attention to a third important feature of
Flemish TA as a whole, which complements the interpretation that
established institutes like IST fail to reposition themselves in light
of new challenges. Various Flemish politicians, industry actors, and
scientists argue that Flemish TA is not a neutral governance tool,
but politically partisan, as TA emanated on the left side of the polit-
ical spectrum; specifically among the green and socialist parties.
The establishment of STV in response to the DIRV campaign ren-
ders explicit how Flemish TA has politics, to paraphrase Langdon
Winner (1980). Politics here is defined as achieving and exercising
positions of influence within, and through, organized party politics.
Given Flanders’ multiparty political system, these politics provide
an often overlooked explanation as to why  the IST was disman-
tled, as since 2009 Flemings have increasingly voted for right-wing,
conservative parties that are at best indifferent to TA and at worst
vehemently opposed to it. As noted elsewhere (Van Oudheusden,
2014a), TA’s political affiliations are often denied or downplayed
across TA communities. TA is typically framed as an analytic activ-
ity aimed at providing decision makers with an objective analysis
of a technology (Van Eijndhoven, 1997) and/or as an interactive and
communicative tool that aims to enrich the basis for STI decision
making (Decker and Ladikas, 2004). While some policymakers may
find these broad designations (i.e. geared towards all political fac-
tions and to the benefit of all innovation actors) of TA compelling,
they risk trivializing and undermining the very policy changes TA
advocates seek to instigate when TA is associated with specific polit-
ical parties or politicians23.
These considerations call into question the widely shared
assumption among TA proponents and some policymakers that
TA and responsible innovation go hand in hand (Von Schomberg,
2012). Whereas TA is correctly ascribed great potential as a
tool for strategic intelligence (Kuhlmann, 2001b) and democratic
22 These assertions are based on interviews the first author had with former IST
staff, politicians, and implicated others; as is the understanding that “TA has politics”
below.
23 Here, an instructive comparison could be drawn with the American Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), which US Congress abolished in 1995. A former OTA
staff member, LaPorte (2013), argues that OTA was not always perceived of as neutral
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nnovation governance (Bijker, 2013), the developments in Flan-
ers (and Denmark) point to potentially significant pitfalls inherent
n institutionalizing TA and in aligning technological, economic,
nd social rationales in the first place. Connecting and coordinating
A experiments through cross-national, networked programs like
ACITA is a possible means of attending to such pitfalls (Ely et al.,
014). Yet, to further maximize collective learning among these
etworks, and to more fully grasp the mechanisms of innovation
overnance at large, the uncertainties and paradoxes in TA prac-
ices should be debated head-on and addressed by TA communities,
olicymakers, and innovation scholars.
. Conclusion
This article describes how Flemish technology assessment (TA)
nitiatives have unfolded with Flemish science, technology, and
nnovation (STI) policies from the 1980s to the present day. Build-
ng on a historical review of Flemish STI and TA processes, it links
arious TA strands (early-warning, bottom-up, and interactive TA)
o different generations of innovation thinking in Europe. The arti-
le suggests that Flemish TA contested and complemented Flemish
nnovation policies; typically by bringing new actors (e.g. trade
nions) and issues (e.g. ecological concerns) to the policy innova-
ion table and by stimulating more interactive kinds of STI decision
aking.
In the process, tensions and struggles emerged between TA aspi-
ations and STI policies. Arguably, these tensions were most potent
n the early eighties, when TA emerged as a counterforce to the
ominant technology- and economy-driven DIRV campaign of the
lemish government. Yet, even after the institutionalization of TA
n the Flemish parliament in 2000 and the now general acknowl-
dgment of the importance of cooperation and social responsibility
n STI, TA remains a fragile knowledge-based economy (KBE)-
nstrument, highly dependent on economic and social forces and
ynamics. These forces also include politics, as Flemish TA is his-
orically affiliated with the green and socialist parties.
These observations raise a number of intriguing questions about
he role and potential of TA in contemporary KBEs. To the extent
hat TA is read as a distinct alternative to the market that fundamen-
ally challenges the way innovation is done, TA aspirations cannot
imply be integrated into the dominant growth images. Conversely,
he institutionalization of TA may  imply a “taming” of TA’s unruly
nd policy-critical potential, as TA actors, concepts, resources, etc.,
re “blended into the establishment” (Horst, 2014). By implication,
A loses some of its critical clout, as TA language, objects, and acts
re, or can be, appropriated into business-as-usual.
Given the institutional disintegration of TA in certain places and
ts potential expansion in others, it is important to understand how
A positions itself, or is positioned, in relation to policy at large
nd innovation policies specifically. While care should be taken
ot to exaggerate TA’s role in bringing about STI policy change, its
otential as a conduit for sociotechnical innovation should not be
inimized either. This is because TA operates within, and through,
he confines of particular ideological STI systems and unfolds with
he advent of strategic science and the KBE. At the very least, it is
ndicative of actual and pending shifts in STI policies, such as the
resent-day evolutions towards more open innovation, responsi-
le innovation, and innovation governance, which play out across
urope, the United States, and elsewhere.
For these reasons, the Flemish experiments with TA should
ncite critical reflection among TA communities and innovation
cholars on TA’s strategic usefulness for policymakers, innovation
ntrepreneurs, civil society organizations, scientists, technologists,
nd publics. Clearly, if TAs are to exert a lasting influence, TA actors
ust render clear to these actors TA’s credentials as a decisive Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1885
knowledge player in the KBE. Failure to do so risks undermining
TA’s relevance, to use a strategic science term. In turn, policymakers
and innovation scholars can draw on the Flemish TA case to ques-
tion and perhaps refine contemporary notions of innovation, as
“innovation governance” gains ever more public acclaim and policy
momentum.
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Appendix A. List of interviewees
Interviewee names are followed by the interviewee’s present
and past affiliations (where relevant).
Paul Berckmans, Flanders Social and Economic Council (SERV),
Stichting Technologie Vlaanderen (STV); Robby Berloznick, Flem-
ish Institute for Technological Research (VITO), Institute for Science
and Technology (IST; formerly viwTA); Donaat Cosaert, Green Party
(Flemish Parliament), IST; Marian Deblonde, VITO, IST, Nanotech-
nologies for Tomorrow’s Society (NanoSoc); Johan Evers, Flemish
Department of Foreign Affairs, IST, NanoSoc; Lieve Goorden,
NanoSoc, STV; Dirk Holemans, Green Party (Flemish Parliament);
Erik Laes, VITO; Jan Larosse, Government Agency for Innovation
in Science and Technology (IWT), European Commission Seconded
national expert; Herman Maes, Interuniversity Microelectronics
Center (IMEC); Stijn Oosterlynck, University of Antwerp; Undis-
closed interviewee, Flemish Ministry of Innovation.
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